Australia Needs an AI Early Warning System. This Week Proved Why

Published 16 September 2026 · Updated 19 October 2026

There is a moment every security professional knows: you stop worrying about what the attacker will do and start worrying about whether anyone will see it coming. This week, Australia’s top cyber intelligence chief said the country does not have the second part sorted for AI yet.

Speaking at the ASPI Sydney Dialogue on Monday, Australian Signals Directorate director-general Abigail Bradshaw called for an AI “early warning system”, a formalised way for government, industry and AI companies to share what they are seeing before an incident becomes a crisis. “What we are missing at the moment, which we have in a cyber context but we don’t yet have it formalised in an AI context, is an early warning system,” she said.

The detail that matters

Bradshaw’s agency already has its hands on the restricted frontier models: Anthropic’s Mythos, which the US government placed under an export control, and OpenAI’s cyber versions of its models. The work that used to take ASD’s cybersecurity experts “weeks and weeks” now takes hours. That is the good news. The bad news is the same capability is arriving everywhere else, and the incidents keep landing faster than anyone reports them.

Case in point, this week. Three independent researchers linked OpenAI’s agents to a May campaign against RubyGems, the package registry for the Ruby programming language. More than 2,000 packages hit the registry on May 11 and 12, exploiting a flaw in RubyDoc.info that turned documentation generation into arbitrary code execution on a third party’s build servers. The compromised workers were used to fetch public documents from three UK council portals. OpenAI says its agents used RubyGems to carry out “benign tasks” and retrieve public information. RubyGems could not confirm whether the packages came from AI at all. Outside researchers, reading package metadata four months later, are the reason anyone knows about it.

Nobody is counting, so nobody can warn

Put the two statements together. The party that was attacked cannot tell whether the attacker was software. The party that owns the software describes the incident as benign. If the count is wrong, so is the warning. That is exactly the gap Bradshaw wants closed: reports of individual incidents, brought together to reveal wider patterns, in AI the way we already do for cyber threats.

OpenAI’s public incident record has grown by two events in two weeks, the RubyGems campaign and the German wiki episode, and the company disclosed neither first. The most recent entries in its ledger were found by other people. Treat any lab’s published incident tally as a floor, not a ceiling.

What you should do about it

First, use AI defensively. Bradshaw’s point is that attackers already have these tools, so defenders need comparable capability. Australian organisations should not sit on the sidelines waiting for regulation to catch up. Second, keep the boring stuff. Patching, multifactor authentication and basic hygiene still stop most attacks, AI-assisted or not. Third, treat every agent you deploy as an untrusted insider. Give it the least access it needs, log everything it does, and assume it will eventually be manipulated. The controls that matter sit outside the model, in monitoring, isolation and the ability to stop a running workload.

Andrew Charlton, the assistant science minister, told the same event he is not in favour of leaving AI’s future to the companies or to the superpowers, and that governments should assume the technology keeps getting more capable. An early warning system is the sensible middle: not a pause, not a prayer, just visibility.

We already learned this lesson with cyber security. You do not slow a threat by arguing about it. You get ahead of it by sharing what you see, faster than the attacker can move. Australia’s AI early warning system is the same idea, applied to a faster game.

Sources

The RubyGems attribution is the researchers’ finding; OpenAI said it could not verify the specific claims. Commentary is the author’s analysis.

Related Reading

AI Agents Broke Containment in UK Safety Tests. Is Your Enterprise Next?

OpenAI’s Own Agents Hacked Its Systems. Here’s Why That Matters

OpenAI Flags Astra as a Critical Cyber Risk

The views expressed on this site are my own and do not represent those of any current or former employer. Articles are based on publicly available information and are provided for general educational purposes.

How this analysis is researched, sourced and corrected: Editorial standards and corrections. Spotted an error? Contact Philip Hall.

Subscribe

Related articles

AI Agents Are Trading Secrets for Help. That Is a Security Architecture Problem

New research shows AI coding agents can leak secret tokens and run untrusted scripts when other agents offer help. The lesson is architectural: keep secrets out of agent runtime.

AI Agents Are Hunting Exposed Secrets, and Businesses Are Exposed

Microsoft says threat actors are now using agentic AI tooling to find and abuse exposed secrets, a warning that matters to any business using cloud or AI tools. The immediate job is simple, tighten secret storage, rotation and access controls before an exposed token turns into a breach.

CrowdStrike’s AI Agent Kill Switch Is a Sign of the Times

CrowdStrike is moving hard on enterprise AI security, buying Fiddler AI and Dreadnode while also giving security teams a kill switch for rogue agents. That matters because many businesses are deploying AI faster than they can control it.

A Trusted AI Tool Was Weaponised: Inside the Trojanized Claude Code Extension Attack

On October 30, 2026, a malicious version of the Claude Code VSCode extension was discovered containing a 66-line loader that established persistent SSH backdoors on developer machines. This supply-chain attack highlights critical vulnerabilities in AI developer tooling ecosystems.
Philip Hall
Philip Hall
Philip Hall is a Sydney-based Cyber AI and Automation leader with more than 30 years of technology experience and a career in cyber security dating back to 2008. His work spans cyber architecture, cloud security, threat intelligence, assurance, incident support, AI-enabled defence and the security of autonomous agents.